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 If you know your enemy and know yourself,
 you need not fear the result of a hundred
 battles - Sun Tzu
 INTRODUCTION
 The mation Chiefs ability of is to a Staffs obtain vital part and vision exploit of of the future infor- Joint
 mation is a vital part of the Joint
 Chiefs of St ffs isi n of future
 conflict expressed in Joint Vision 20 10.1
 To ensure that armed forces obtain and use
 information effectively in conflict, a better
 understanding of the relationship between
 information, force advantage, and officers'
 perception of them must be gained.
 This paper summarizes the results of
 controlled human experiments that address
 how military officers and Department of
 Defense analysts use information and per-
 ceive its value in a simple contest. See
 John McGunnigle' s Master's Thesis,
 Information on Information: Comparing
 the Military Values of Force Advantage and
 Information Advantage , for further details.2
 The experiments also estimate how the
 same decision makers perform when given
 a force advantage. A force advantage is
 defined as having better forces than the
 opponent in numbers, firepower and/or sur-
 vivability. The results demonstrate that
 military decision makers often do not use
 information optimally - even in a simple
 stress-free situation. Equally insightful, the
 military decision makers significantly over-
 estimated the value of information com-
 pared to force advantage, suggesting that
 they too readily embrace the current enthu-
 siasm for information technologies.
 BACKGROUND
 Information and Decision
 Making in General
 There has been a great deal of research
 on how individual decision makers per-
 form, most of it in non-defense contexts. In
 many cases decision makers do not perform
 optimally or even rationally. A few exam-
 ples will illustrate the phenomena. Deci-
 sion makers are usually overconfident in
 their estimates of a situation.3 Decision
 makers tend to not give as much weight to
 probabilistic evidence as they should; and,
 in terms of Bayes' rule, tend to persist in
 giving too much weight to their initial esti-
 mates.4 Collecting additional information
 does not always enhance the quality of a
 decision when subject to an environment of
 very high uncertainty.5 In fact, a decision
 maker with complete information about the
 opponent's possible outcomes often uses
 the information disadvantageously, mini-
 mizing potential losses rather than maxi-
 mizing gains.6 Furthermore, too much
 information can surpass the decision
 maker's capacity to effectively utilize it.7
 Previous Research Concerning the
 Military Value of Information
 The literature conclusively shows that
 decisionmaking is extremely complex and
 the value of information can be uncertain.
 This is probably one reason there is a dearth
 of quantitative controlled studies using mili-
 tary subjects on the value of information in
 conflict. Furthermore, very few studies
 vary both force and information advantage.
 Much of the research on the military value
 of information is based on rational choice
 and the intelligent application of operations
 research. Bracken and Darilek addressed
 the question of how much information
 might be required for a force to achieve
 information superiority over an opponent
 in a two-person zero-sum game.8 They
 conclude that information can give a force
 a significant advantage over its adversary
 when the decisions are made optimally.
 They note that "non-optimal decision rules
 can lead to significantly inferior results."
 Other analyses (with no direct human
 experiments) have shown varying degrees
 of the value of information in conflicts
 using Lanchester models, probability mod-
 els, and even board games (such as
 Go)* 10, 11,12
 Some few studies have involved human
 subjects. A lengthy study of Army com-
 mand and control performance measure-
 ment found that staff decision making per-
 formance could not only be measured, but
 also improved.13 However, "the measured
 relationships between command group per-
 formance and command group effective-
 ness... disappeared almost completely
 when battle outcome data [effectiveness]
 were substituted for decision quality [per-
 formance]." Sherrill and Barr estimated
 the links between information level and
 combat success on six subjects in simulat-
 ed brigade level combat.14 They found
 that "relationships... between information
 level and battle success appear to have
 potential utility in allowing one to estimate
 the impact of proposed changes in intelli-
 gence products or reconnaissance sensors,
 platforms or tactics." Simpson and Falle-
 sen examined the relationship between
 conceptual capacity and the ability to dis-
 cern critical information.15 Their findings
 from Advanced Warflghter Experiments,
 Warfighter Exercises and Combat Training
 Center rotations indicated that military
 leaders were not improving in their abili-
 ties to determine what information was rel-
 evant and how to properly package and
 disseminate that information to the appro-
 priate level.
 Looking across these (and other) stud-
 ies we see that the value of information in
 military conflicts depends on the context
 and is highly variable.
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 THE SIMPLE CONTEST
 Empirical human experimentation is
 required to gain an understanding of the
 value of information in conflict, as well as
 how it should be presented and acted upon.
 The variability in humans requires that many
 subjects participate. This section describes a
 simple contest that was designed by author
 McGunnigle to investigate how decision
 makers use information and perceive its
 value.
 Simple Contest Description
 In the simple contest there are two sides
 and ten positions. The objective of the con-
 test is to control the majority of the posi-
 tions. Each side is given ten units. Each
 unit has a number assigned to it, indicating
 the strength of the unit. In the base contest,
 each side gets units of strengths 1, 2, . . ., 10,
 which they can place in any of the positions.
 Each position must be defended, i.e., one
 unit must be placed in each position. In the
 base case, neither side knows how the oth-
 ers' units are assigned before the contest is
 determined. After the final assignment of
 each side's units, the values are revealed and
 the side whose unit has the higher strength
 wins the position. If both sides have the
 same value at a position, a fair coin is tossed
 to determine the winner. After all ten posi-
 tions are evaluated, the side with the most
 positions wins. If each side holds five posi-
 tions the contest is a tie.
 A force advantage is given to a side by
 adding a number to each of the side's origi-
 nal unit strengths. For example, a force
 advantage of one would give a player units
 with strength 2, 3, . . ., 1 1. This increases the
 total force count from 55 to 65, an increase
 of 18 percent. An information advantage is
 given to a side by revealing one or more of
 the opponent's position assignments before
 the game is evaluated. This allows the play-
 er with the information advantage to advan-
 tageously assign his units to positions based
 on the information. For example, an infor-
 mation advantage of three would reveal an
 opponent's assignment to three positions.
 Given an information advantage and
 assuming that the information given is accu-
 rate, an optimal assignment of the units with
 the information advantage can be made,
 which is to assign a unit to the revealed posi-
 tion with strength exactly one greater than
 the opponent's unit, except for the case
 when the position revealed has a ten
 assigned to it. In this case, the optimal deci-
 sion is to assign the unit with a strength of
 one to that position. If no information
 advantage is given, the assignment of units
 to positions has no effect on the probability
 of winning.
 THE SIMULATION AND
 HUMAN EXPERIMENTS
 The simple contest was used to measure
 how information and force advantage
 enhance the chance of winning. To get a
 baseline result the contest was simulated
 with optimal decision rules, i.e., no human
 subjects. These experiments are referred to
 as the "simple contest simulation ." The
 human "in-the-loop" experiments are called
 the "simple contest experiment ." In both
 sets of trials the chances of winning are mea-
 sured for various levels of force and infor-
 mation advantage. Ties and losses are mea-
 sured as "not winning."
 The Simulation
 Six cases with varying levels of informa-
 ion and force advantage were simulated to
 measure how advantages in force and infor-
 mation influence the chances of winning
 with optimal decision making. There is a
 Blue side and a Red side. Case 1 is the base
case, with equivalent forces on each side and
 no information or force advantage. Cases 2
 thr ugh 4 examine what happens when Blue
 has increasing amounts of information by
 revealing, respectively, the Red force's unit
 strengths at one, two and three positions.
 Cases 5 and 6 give Blue force advantages of
 one and two, respectively. The probability
 that the Blue side wins is estimated by
 100,000 trials of the simulation for each
 case. This provides an accurate estimate of
 the probability that Blue wins (with a stan-
 dard error less than .0016).
 The Human Experiments
 To address how military decision makers
 use and perceive information in the simple
 contest, the same six cases were run with the
 subject (Blue) playing against the computer
 (Red). The subjects were 30 military deci-
 sion makers, including Naval officers,
 Marine Corps officers, and Department of
 the Navy analysts. The subjects had at least
 a college degree, and the military subjects
 ranked from Navy Lieutenant to Navy Cap-
 tain.
 Each subject was read the description of
 the contest and then given five practice tri-
 als. During the practice trials the subjects
 were allowed to ask questions about how to
 use the program. The subjects were then
 given five trials for each of the six cases.
 The order in which each trial of each case
 was presented to the subject was random-
 (See EXPERIMENTS, p. 26)
 Table 1. The results of the six cases. The winning proportion increases with an infor-
 mation or force advantage. The P-values with a * correspond to one-sided hypothesis
 tests, while The P-values with a ** correspond to two-sided hypothesis tests.
 Info. Force winning winning proportions
 advantage advantage proportion proportion (P-value)
 Case 1 None None .2936 .3067 .7281**
 Case 2 One None .4742 .3867 .0139*
 Case 3 Two None .6808 .6400 .1491*
 Case 4 Three None .8602 .7767 .0034*
 Case 5 None One .6874 .6800 .8461**
 Case 6 None Two .9239 .9067 .4692**
 Table 2. Summary of survey results. For Question one, the subjects that answered a
 'better chance' and the 'same chance' (22 out of 30) overvalued the information
 advantage vis-à-vis force advantage. For Question two, the subjects that answered a
 'better chance' (26 out of 30) also overvalued the information.
 Better chance Same chance Worse chance
Question one 13 9 8
 Question two 26 3 1
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 TRADITION
 (continued from p. 25)
 good graces.]
 The six half-day sessions, spread through
 three and one-half days (the traditional half-
 day sojourn to the sights, bookstores, and
 pubs of Oxford was re-instituted after hav-
 ing been missed at 16 ISMOR), allowed for
 the presentation of 35 papers and a few
 hours of informal discussions during the
 final session on Friday morning. The papers
 were distributed geographically as: UK- 14,
 US-11, Germany-3, and one each from
 Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
 France, Israel and Sweden. Two more inno-
 vations were introduced during the presenta-
 tions. First, two papers were from Eastern
 European nations. Second, a part of a US
 Marine Corps Combat Development Com-
 mand presentation was given by a student
 from one of the military colleges, Midship-
 man First Class D. A. Reiher from the Unit-
 ed States Naval Academy. Midshipman
 Reiher is the first student from any military
 undergraduate institution ever to attend an
 ISMOR. [A complete listing of the papers
 and authors, with addresses, can be obtained
 by contacting Gene Visco, FS via e-mail at
 gvisco@bellatlantic.net.]
 Performing with his usual aplomb was
 C irman David Faddy, as always carrying
 on the fine traditions of the founder, the late
 Ronnie Shephard. Dealing with the myriad
 etails and inevitable fusses of the sympo-
 sium with good cheer and graciousness was
 Trish Follows, who has been the ISMOR
 Administrator since its beginnings; she was
 ably assisted by her friend and colleague
 Debbie Reccia.
 Among the distinguished members of
 MORS present, in addition to the authors of
 this rticle, were: James C. Cooke, OSD
 (PA&E); COL Phillip J. Exner, Director,
 Studies and Analysis, Marine Corps Com-
 bat Development Command; LCDR Aas-
 geir Gangsaas, OSD (PA&E); LTC Jerry
 Glasow, ODUSA(OR); Priscilla Glasow,
 MITRE Corporation; Prof Wayne P.
 Hughes Jr., FS, US Naval Postgraduate
 School; Martín Lidy, IDA; Frank Mah-
 ncke, Joint Warfare Analysis Center; Dr
 Walter L. Perry, RAND Corporation; Prof
 Peter Purdue, US Naval Postgraduate
 School; and Dr David Schrady, FS, US
 Naval Postgraduate School. Five of the US
 papers were presented by MORS members.
 The traditional Professor Ronnie Shep-
 hard Memorial Address was delivered dur-
 ing the banquet on Thursday evening by
 Prof Reiner K. Huber, Universität der
 Bundeswehr München. Professor Huber is
 as well-known on this side of the Atlantic as
 he is in Europe. Professor Huber's selection
 to deliver the Shephard lecture was another
 break with tradition; he is the first continen-
 tal European invited to present the banquet
 talk. The text of his paper can be found in
 this edition of PHALANX Online.
 Plans for 18 ISMOR will be underway
 shortly; the announcement and call for
 papers is expected to be distributed in spring
 2001. The symposium is likely to be sched-
 uled for the period 27 through 31 August
 2001, again at Eynsham Hall (mark your
 calendars). To be placed on the US mailing
 list, contact Mr Visco at the above e-mail
 address. O
 EXPERIMENTS
 ( continued from p. 11)
 ized, but known to the subject. The subject
 had an unlimited amount of time to finish
 each trial. For each trial, the subject was able
 to reassign his units as desired and then eval-
 uate the trial. After each trial, the subject
 was able to see the result as a win, tie or
 loss.
 After the subject completed the thirty tri-
 als they were asked two questions:
 • Question one: Does information
 revealing the opponent's first position
 give a better chance, the same chance,
 or a worse chance of winning the sim-
 ple contest than a force advantage of
 one which gives your side units with
 strengths of 2, 3, ..., 11?"
 • Question two: Does information
 revealing the opponent's first and sec-
 ond positions give a better chance, the
 same chance, or a worse chance of win-
 ning the simple contest than a force
 advantage of one which gives your side
 units with strengths of 2, 3, ..., 11?
 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
 The results of the simulation and human
 experiments are displayed in Table 1. The
 probabilities of Blue winning, based on 150
 trials (30 subjects with five replications per
 subject) for each of the six cases of the
 human experiments, are displayed in column
 five of Table 1. Column four displays the
 probabilities generated by the simulation.
 The results of the simple contest experiment
 show the extent to which force advantage
 and information advantage enhance the
 chance of winning. The subject's answers to
 Questions one and two on their perceptions
 of the values of information vis-à-vis force
 advantage are displayed in Table 2.
 ANALYSIS
 Interesting insights can be gleaned by
 comparing how the subjects perform when
 given various levels of information advan-
 tage and force advantage, and measuring
 their performance against that of the optimal
 decisions, as determined by the simulation.
 The rows of Table 1, from Case 1 to Case
 4, show the benefits of increasing the infor-
 mation that the Blue "commander" has on
 the Red forces. As expected, the probability
 of winning increases as the subjects are
 given more information. However, in Cases
 2 through 4 the subjects as a whole did not
 use the information optimally - i.e., as well
 as the simulated Blue commander. In Case
 2 and Case 4 the difference is statistically
 significant. These tests are one-sided
 hypothesis tests because we are testing
 whether the subjects' chance of winning is
 "equal to" versus "less than" the winning
 probabilities of the simulation.
 The benefits of increasing force advan-
 tage is seen by comparing Case 1, Case 5
 and Case 6. The probability of winning
 increases dramatically as the subjects are
 given a greater force advantage. In these
 cases, the strategies used by the subjects
 have no effect on the probability of winning.
 This was not communicated to them. There-
 fore, the limiting probabilities that Blue wins
 Case 1, Case 2 and Case 6 should be the
 same for the subjects and the computer.
 This is verified by the hypothesis tests.
 Here, two-sided hypothesis tests are used
 because we were testing whether the sub-
 jects' chance of winning was "equal to" ver-
 sus "not equal to" the winning probabilities
 of the simulation.
 Across the various levels of force advan-
 tage and information advantage a clear
 ordering is possible. A force advantage of
 one is preferred to an information advantage
 of one and is about equal to an information
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 advantage of two. An information advan-
 tage of three is preferred to a force advan-
 tage of one. But, a force advantage of two is
 preferred to an information advantage of
 three. This ordering applies to both the
 experiments and the simulations. Yet, the
 subjects overestimated the value of informa-
 tion vis-à-vis force advantage - even after
 completing five trials with feedback for each
 of the six cases. The most striking is that 22
 of 30 subjects did not prefer a force advan-
 tage of one to an information advantage of
 one, even though the force advantage of one
 out-performed the information advantage of
 one by .6800 to .3867. Considering the
 experiment's simplicity, this suggests that
 military decision makers in real situations




 These experiments contribute to under-
 standing how information might affect mili-
 tary conflicts by utilizing a reasonable sam-
 ple of military subjects in a controlled
 environment and varying both information
 and force advantage in thousands of compu-
 tational experiments. The results suggest
 that it may be more difficult to realize the
 benefits of information superiority than
 many believe. The implication is that enthu-
 siasm for information technologies should
 be tempered in arriving at the best balance
 between more knowledge and more forces.
 Of course, the value of information in con-
 flict will depend strongly on many factors,
 including: the scenarios, the timeliness and
 accuracy of the information, and the talent
 and experience of tactical commanders
 under stress. Gaining an understanding of
 the value of information across this breadth
 of conditions requires extensive controlled
 human experimentation. Towards that goal
 we would like to see:
 (1) Many more simple and focused con-
 trolled human experiments with varying
 levels of information, its accuracy, and
 how it is presented to decision makers in
 a variety of conditions and scenarios.
 (2) The establishment of a searchable cata-
 logue on the results of studies on the
 value of information with which ana-
 lysts could synthesize what the whole of
 the experiments show. This should
 include everything from large in-the-
 field tests, such as the Warfighting
 Experiments, to rigorously controlled
 human experiments as in this study, to
 computer simulations and mathematical
 analysis. This will facilitate identifying
 clear trends where information superior-
 ity will have a big payoff and what other
 forms of force advantage are needed to
 realize it.
 Though an obstinate fight may be made by a
 small force, in the end it must be captured by
 the larger force - Sun Tzu
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